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Abstract
This study was designed to investigate the determinants of choice in a
/

low investment situation prior to and after failure at a task.

One hundred

forty-seven subjects were randomly placed in one of four experiaental groups-subjects know they have a high probability of solving a task; subjects know
they have a low probability of solving a task; subjects don't know their probability of solving a task but for one group it is high and for another it i.
low.

Failure at solving a chosen task was induced in all subjects to deter-

mine the effect of failure on the determinants of choice.

Subjects were

questioned as to their need for experimental points--high need operationally
defined as needing four points or more and low need as needing three points
or less.

On the basis of subjects' need for experimental points each of the

four major treatment categories was

d~v'eded
I

per treatment category.

into high and low need subjects

'

Four-celled chi-square tests on the number of high

need subjects choosing a task worth 5 points and low need subjects choosing a
task worth 1 or 2 points per treatment category yielded high significant
diffe~nces

in that high need subjects chose tasks worth

5 points and low need

subjects chose tasks worth 1 or 2 points, i.e •• need is a significant determinant of choice in a low investment situation.

Differences witb respect to

the knowledge of probability and no knowledge of probability treatments
yielded marginal significance in that need is a greater detel'llinant of choice
when probability of success is not known. 1 ••• t need was the sole detenainant
of choice when probability was given.

Chi-square difference. between high

1\

•

and low probability of success treatments did not yield any difference with
"',

respect to the number of high need

'"

subj.c~

-chOOSing a task worth 5 points.

After failure in solving tasks,

chi-~quare

tests again yielded significant

differences between the number of high and low need subjects choosing a task
worth 5 points.

//

There was no difference in the probability not given

treatment with respect to the number of high need subjects choosing task .5
between the high and low probability condition.

However, in the probability

given treatment condition there was a trend in the direction of fewer high
need subjects choosing 5 in the low probability condition after failure.
The conclusions are that need is a significant determinant of choice
in a low investment situation and that knowledge of the probability of Succe.s
will also be a determinant of choice.

Also, the results suggest a trend in

the direction of failure at a task to increase the weight given to probabllitJ
as a determinant of choice.

Results of this study are in essential agree_nt

with those of previous studies.

Devaluation of a Desired Object
As a Function of Expectancy:
A Refutation of Dissonance

/

Richard R. Izzett
Loyola University
Concerning theories of motivation there are two questions which must
be answered.

One is to account for an individual's choice of one alter-

native among a set of alternatives'and the second is to account for the
intensity or striving for the goal once it is initiated.
The present study is concerned primarily with the first question and
represents an attempt to isolate the effects of differences in strength of
expectancy and incentive on choice behavior. Also, an expectancy model
(Tolman, 1959; Rotter, 1955; Edwards, 19..54; MacCorquodale and Meehl, 1953;
and Vroom, 1964) and Festinger's (1957)' theory' of cognitive dissonance are
used to generate predictions of choice behavior follOWing the experimental
manipulation of probability of success, valence and failure at a task in
a low investaent .situation.
A.tkinson (1957. p. 360) definet expectancy as ••• "a cognitive anticip&tion usually aroused by

cu~s

in a situation, that perfonu.nce of some act

will be followed by a particular consequence."

.

He also defines incentive

(in the case of this paper valence) "as the relative attractiveness or a
specific goal that is offered in a situation or the relative unattractiveness
of an event that might occur as a consequence of some act."
In his theory of the motivational determinants of risk taking behavior,
Atkinson (1958) defines the strength of the motivation to perform an act

3
)

to be a multiplicative function of the strength of the Motive (a disposition
to strive for a certain kind of satisfaction). the expectancy that the act
will have as a consequence the attailBent of an incentive,'and the value
of the incentive (valence).

However. Atkinson posits .xpectancy and inc.ntive

to b. inTersly related to one another, i.... incentive (I) • l-P (expectancy).
In this case the more difficult the task the aore attractive it is.
Alternatively. Rosen (1961&) states that it is unclear what predictions
can be generated by Atkinson's theory when determinants other than ditficulty
contribute to the incentive value of success.
as to what predictions can be aade about

~hoice

The question therefore, arises
behavior when there are

already well established incentive values prior to obtaining information
on which expectancies are based.
Rosen (l96lb) states that

occupat~onal

preferenc.s are influenced by

cultural values in addition to ttle ,pe'rceiv.d ,difticulty of

t~

occupation

and he demonstrated that val.nce and probability of success are directly
related rather than inversely r.lat.d as d.scribed by Atkinson, i •••• it
the probability of attaining a goal is d.creased the attractiveness of the
goal is also decreased.
Rosen had subjects list in order of preference a nUDlber of occupatioft8
based not on what the subject wanted in terms of his int.rests but upon
consid.rations such as salary and social standing or prestige value of eacb
occupation.
Aptitude Test

Following this Rosen had his subjects take a Differential
(~T)

to determine the probability that the subject would be

able to achieve his most preferred occupation.

He then gave tbe subjects

falsified DAT results which eitber indicated that the subject would have a

4

good or poor chance of achieving this occupation.

He then had his subjects

again order in terms of preference which occupations he preferred the most.
Rosen found that when ,2s are given probability ratings for goals with high
valence, those given low probability of success ratings were most likely
to lower the valence of the goal.

When.2s were given probability of success

ratings for neutral valenced goals, those given high probability of success
ratings were most likely to change the valence of the goal.

In other words,

there was an anchoring of attitudes only with high probability of success
cognitions and highly valued goals or with low probability of success ratings
and neutral goals.
Rosen considers the choice among goals to be a joint function of the
valence of the goal and the probability of attaining it.

For a given valence,

the strength of the motivation to aohiere the goal is a function of the
probability and for a given probability of sUQcess the strength of the aotivation~is

a function of the valence.

This is also in accordance with Vrooa (1964) who states that "the
force on a person to perfor.. an act is a monotonically increasing function
of the algebraic sua of the products of the valences of all outcomes and
the strength of his expectancies that the act will be followed by the
attainment of these outcoaes

(p~

18).

Thus, it is apparent that an individual who chooses among altematiYes
which involve uncertain outcomes. his behavior will be affected not only
by his preferences among the alternatives but also by the degree to which
he believes the outcomes to be probable (Tolman, Rotter, Edwards, Vroom.
Rosen, MacCorquodale and Meehl).

5

Atkinson in a series of experiments has demonstrated that s subject
is more willing to perform on a task when the incentive is $2.50 than when
it is $1.25 no matter what the probability of winning providing the probabilities are kept constant across both conditions.
Edwards (1953, 19.54) has demonstrated that two factors are most important in determining choices: general preferences or dislikes for risktaking and specific preferences among probabilities.

Subjects preferred

low probabilities of losing large amounts of money to large probabilities
of losing small amounts of money.

He also found out that on positive ex,

pected value bets, subjects

~re

more willing to accept long shots when

playing for real money than when just playing for worthless chips.

In other

words t when a subject can really use the incentive they are more willin&
to take a chance and try for it than wnen they do not need it and cannot
utilize it for any purpose.

,'

This f£ftding W&1'just the reverse for negative

expected value bets.
fn the above experiments the incentive was money--an object whicb mOlt
people do not have a surplus of.

In both situations, (excluding the neg-

ative expected value situation), the subjects had nothing to lose--there
was little investment.
A question can now be raised as to what would happen in a low involve.
ment situation involving an incentive based not on money but on an object
in which there may be "consumer's surplus" (a phrase coined by Marshal, 1948),
i.e., what will be the determinants of choice in a situation wbere there
are subjects with high need and also those with low need.

Will subjects'

need be the predominating factor governing choice? Will valence of geal

6

and probability of success affect high and low need subjects differently?
Based upon the findings of Atkinson and Edwards and Hosen, it is
hypothesized that in a low investment situation: 1) choice of a task is
based primarily on need; and 2) need will be more prominent in governing
choice behavior in the absence of knowledge concerning probability of
success than in its presence.
There is also an interest in what effect failure to obtain a goal
will have upon the desirability of the goal.
Atkinson states that failure to obtain an easy goal will increase
the desirability to obtain the goal for those subjects whose motive to
achieve success (measured by the TAT) is greater than their motivation to
avoid failure; and that failure to obtain a difficult goal will decrease
the attractiveness of th& goal for these same subjects.

.

On the other hand for those suQjects
whose motivation to avoid failure
,.
is greater than their motivation to achieve success, failure at an easy
,

task will cause the indivipual to seek an easier task and if he fails at
the most difficult task he should stay with it.
Such a theory, however. has no usefulness in generating predictions
concerning those

~.

whose motivation to approach success is equal to their

motivation to avoid failure: nor is it of any use in generating predictions
concerning randoml1 selected groups of

~s

upon whom there are no TAT scores.

Therefore, Vroom's expectancy theory and balance theories will be contrasted
(Heider, 1944: Newcomb, 1953. Festinger. 1957).
Balance theories predict that a discrepancy between two cognitions
produces discomfort which results in a motivation to utilize dissonance
reducing mechanisms.

The degree to which dissonance-reducing mechaniSlls

7

are utilized is assumed to be a direct function of the discrepancy between
the two

cog~tions.

If a subject with high need fails to obtain an attract1Tegoal aore
dissonance should result if the probability of. obtaining the goal was high
than' if it was low.

As a result more high need subjects should decrease

the attractiveness of the desired goal when the probability of obtaining
it was high than when it was low.
Expectancy theory on the other hand would predict just the opposite
in that there will be a "salvage the process effect."

Upon failing to

attain a desired goal, probability will playa greater part in determining
choice behavior than it did prior to failure, i.e., an! with. high need
wUl stick with an easy task but shift for a difficult.

HoweTer. an S with

a low need is more flexible and will switch only if the alternative task
is easy and not when it is

difficul~~~.,

'

Method
Subjects and

Design.~~De

hundred forty-seTen Introductory Psycholol1

students attending Loyola University served as subjects in this study.

Tbe

general design was a 2 x 2 x 2 design in which subjects were given a choice
of solving one ot three tasks.

Each task

hAd

a different value--the subjects

could receiYe 5, 2 or 1 laboratory points (they need 5 per seMster) tor
successful cOlipletionof the task.
Independent variables were: high or low probability ot solving the

5 point task; b) the exper11llenter reporting the probability of solving each
task before or after the subject had made his choice and c) the su~t·.
"need" for" laboratory points, operationally defined high (needing 4 or 5

8

points) or low (needing I, 2. or J points).
Dependent variables were: a) subject's initial choice of task, and b)
subject's choice of task after failing to solve the initia1 task in the
allotted time.
Materials.--Three problem solving tasks were used in this study.
The tasks were a) "wiggle blocks" which consisted of nine almost identical
looking sub-blocks which if joined together in the appropriate way would
form a cube; b) the Wais Object Block Design which consisted of nine separate
cubes each of which had its sides painted either all red, all white, or
half red and half white; and c) a sequence peg board with ten holes and
nine pegs.
Accompanying each problem solving task was one of three 4.x 6 inch
index cards upon which was printed one Qf the three numbers 1, 2, or 5.
The index cards indicating the wort.ti-of the task (in terms of experiaental
points) were randomly placed with one of the three tasks prior to the

~

entering the experimental room.
A stop-watch was used to indicate when the

~'s

two minute problem

solving period was up.
Procedure.-...A.ll S's upon entering the experimental booth were seated
at a table.

Before each subject were the three problem solving tasks each

with an accompanying number representing its worth to the subject in teras
of experimental points.

Expectancy of solving the most positively valent

task (#5) was manipulated by stating to the ~ that his chances were .9.
i.e., nine out of ten (high. probability of succeas)of solving,the task;
or .2, i.e., two out of

te~~(low probability of success) of solving the
9

task; (see Appendix I for complete transcript of the instructions for each
condition).

The probability of solving the tasks worth 1 and 2 points was

held constant throughout the experiment at 1.00.
All three tasks were capable of being solved but were sufficiently
difficult that they could not be completed within a two minute tim. limit.
Knowledge of the probabilities of solving the task was manipulated by
either stating to the

~

the objective probabilities of solving the tasks

before he made his decision (Choice condition) as to which task he wanted
to solve or after he made his decision
After each

~

(~reference

condition).

made his decision as to which task he wanted to work with

(most and least) and after the probabilities of solving each task were
explained to each

~.

all

~s

were given a two minute tiae interval to solve

thei:i' task.
~ince

all tasks were

sufficien~l.¥'difficuft

that they would not be

completed within the two minutes, at the end of theprobl•• solving period
the

~s

were told that they would be given one more chance to solTa the

problem or one of the other problems.

They were again allowed to make a

decision as to which task they wanted to work with.

In this wayan objective

rating could be taken on the number of §.S wbo changed their tasks.
Upon falling to solve a task the second time. the subjects were
questioned about their thoughts and feelinia of the experiment.

Following

this the §.S were briefed about the true nature of the experiaent.
Results
At the conclusion of the experimental session. subjects were questioned
regarding their need for experimental points in order to detel'lline the nuaber
10

of high and low need subjects in each of the four experimental treatments
of C-C.9. C-C.2. P-C.9. and P-C.2.
Table 1 reports the number of high and low need subjects in each of
the four experimental treatments.
Table 1
Number of High and Low Need Subjects
per Treatment Category

Treatment Category

High Need Subjects

Low Need Subjects

C-C.2
Probability Given .2

10

23

C.C.9
Probability Given .9

14

19

P-C.2
Probability Not Given.2

6

31

P-C.9
Probability Not Given .9

20

I

21

Four-celled chi-square tests indicate that there are no difference.
between the C-C.2 and C-C.9 treatments in regards to the number of high
need and low need subjects

falli~

need for experimental points

(i'=

into each treatment on the ba.is ot

1.05. df .-1. N.S.).
t,:

However. differences

between the P.C.2 and P-C.9 treatments were tested by four-celled chi-square
tests and results indicate that significantly more high need subjects fell
into the P-C.9 condition (X2 = 8.78,df.-l, p <.01).
There were no differences bet'Ween-C-C and P-C treatments in regard.
to the number of high and low need subjects falling into these overall
treatment categories (X2

= .1448,

df=l. N.S.) •

. i~~ll

This difference between the P-C.9 and P-C.2 treatment categories with
respect to the number of high need subjects should be kept in mind when
reading the following results.
1s need a greater determinant of choice than probability in a low
investment situation?

The hypotheses predict that in a low investment

situation, choice of a task is based primarily on need.

Table 2 reports

the initial choice of tasks as a function of probability.
Table 2
Initial Choice of Task as a Function ot
,

Need and Probability

Treatment Categorl

High Need Condition
Task Choice
1 or 2
:2

~~"

Low Heed Condition
Task Choice
1 or 2
:2

~
(J) ,

26~

7~
(11)

·2l~

4~

(3)

(8)

(n)

P-C.2
Probability Not Given .2

83~

l~

(5)

(1)

l~
(6)

(25)

P-C.9
Probability Not Given .9

95~
(20)

(1)

5~

l~

C-~.2

Probability GiTen .2
C-C.9
Probability Given .9

(6)

(2)

7~

(17)

~

8l~

(~,

Note: Number in parentheses is N per cell.
Differences within treatment categories with respect to the number
of high need subjects initially choosing 5 and low need subjects initially
choosing 1 or 2 were tested by four-celled chi-equare tests.
High need subjects who had the probability

2i success given !2 ~

prior !2 their choice of task initially chose the task worth 5 points
12
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~ significantly more than low need subjects; also low need subjects who had

t their

I

initially chose a task worth 1 or 2 points instead of

I more

I
.•

probability of success given to them prior to their choice of task

than the high need subjects (X 2

= 10.615,

5 points significantly

df=l, p~.OOl).

With respect to those treatment categories where the probability of

~ not given prior to making ~ initial choice, high need subjects
'I chose the t~sk worth 5 points significantly more times than the tasks worth

I

success

t

1 or 2 pOints and low need subjects initially chose a task worth 1 or 2
points significantly more times than the task worth 5 points (X2 = 40.691
df=l, p<.OOl).

Thus, it appears that need is a significant determinant

of choice in a low investment situation.
To determine if need is a greater determinant of choice than probability, differences with respect to the number of high need subjects
initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2 in the probability given (.9) treatment
and the probability given (.2) treatment were tested by means of four-celled
cbi-square tests.

Also. differences with respect to the number of

~

need subjects initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2 in the probability given (.9)
treatment and the probability given (.2) treatment were tested by means
of four-celled chi-square tests.

The same tests were made for the prob-

ability not given (.9) and probability not given (.2) treatments.
This method of utilizing four-chi-square tests (one for .high need,
and one for low need subjects for each of the two major treatment categories)
was chosen over utilizing two chi-square tests to determine differences
with respect to the overall number of subjects initially choosing

5 or 1 and 2

. in the probability given (.9) and the probability given (.2) treatment, as
[

well as with respect to the overall number of subjects initially choosing

13

5 or 1 and 2 in the probability not given (.9) and (.2) treatments because
of the problem involved in combining treatments having significantly
~ifferent ~·s

For the

with regards to high need subjects.
~

where the probability of success

i!

given, there is no

difference between the .9 and .2 conditions with respect to the number
of high need subjects initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2 (X2 = .2285. df.=l.
N.S.).

Also, there is no difference between the .9 and .2 conditions with

respect to the number of low. need subjects initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2
(X2 = 1.114, df.-l. N.S.).

Thus, it is apparent that need is a greater

determinant of choice than probability in a low investment situation.
For

~ ~

where the probability of success is

is no difference between the

.!!£!:. given. there

.9 and .2 conditions with respect to the number

of high need subjects initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2 (X2
N.~.)

a

.728, df.~l.

nor with respect to the number o.f low need subjects initially choosing

5 or 1 and 2 (X2 = .2984, df.=l, N.S.).
Is need more of a determinant of choice when the probability of
success is not given than when it is given?

The hypotheses predict that

need will be more prominent in governing choice behavior in the absence
of knowledge concerning probability of success than in its presence.

This

is due to the fact that choice is based on need (valence) and probability
(expectancy of attaining a goal).

Data from table 2 are also' utilized to

test this hypothesise
Two separate analyses were performed--one for high need subjects
and one for low need subjects.

Again utilizing four-celled chi-square

ltests the number of high need subjects in both C-C treatments initially
14
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I

!

choosing

5 or 1 and 2 was compared to the number of high need subjects

in both P-C treatments initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2.

Results show

that significantly more high need subjects initially choose 5 in the P-C
conditions (X

2

= 2.78, df.=l, p. < .10).

Also, the number of low need subjects in both C-C treatments initially choosing 1 or 2 was compared to the number of low need subjects
in both P-C treatments initially choosing 1 or 2.

In this case, signifi-

cantly more low need subjects initially chose 1 or 2 in the P-C treatments
(X2 = 3.414, df.=l, p<.lO).

Thus, it appears that need is more a

determinant of choice when probabilities are not known than when probabilities are given.

However, the difference is only marginally significant.

What effect does failure at a task have upon the determinants of
choice?

Upon failure, is need a greater determinant of choice than prob-

ability or does probability have more weigth in governing choice?
The hypotheses predict that upon failure, probability will playa
greater part as a determinant of choice than it had prior to failure
(need will not be as powerful a determinant of choice) however, the specific
predictions generated from dissonance theory and expectancy theory differ
in regards to the effect of failure.
Dissonance theory predicts that if a high need subject fails to
obtain an attractive goal more dissonance should result if the probability
of obtaining the goal was high '(.9) than if it was low (.2), and as a result more high need subjects should decrease the attractiveness of the
desired goal when the probability of obtaining it was high than when it
was low.

15
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i

On the basis of dissonance theory. then. fewer high need subjects

should choose

I within the

5 on the second trial within the .9 treatment conditions;

.2 treatment conditions there should not be an oceurance of

!,'issonance upon failure to attain the goal and just as many high need
I::b~:::: :::::: ::::::t:v:np:::.:::::: :;i::c::s:h:h~:1:~::::::.C::d:::on5.
!

.9 conditions and stay the same in the .2 conditions such that there
should be no difference between the number of high need subjects choosing

5 in the .9 and .2 treatment categories.
Decision theory or expectancy theory would predict that the effect

i of failure would result in more emphasis being put on probability per sa
for the high need subjects, i.e., upon failure fewer high need subjects
should pick

5 on the second trial in the .2 treatment categories than in

the .9 treatment categories.

The subjective probability of subjects should

decrease in the .2 treatment such that the subject has a subjective probability or expectancy of success of less than .2.

This should result in

a "salvage the process" effect such that on the second trial there should
be a greater number of high need subjects choosing 1 or 2 in the .2 treatment categories.

Table J reports the second choice of task by subjects

as a function of need, probability and failure.
To determine what effect failure had upon the determinants of choice,
the number of high need subjects choosing 5 and 1 or 2 was compared to
the number of low need subjects choosing 5 and 1 or 2 for the combined
treatment categories in which the probability was initially given, i.e.,
for the combined C-C (.2) and C-C (.9) groups.
the combined P-C (.2) and P-C

(.9) groups.
16

This was also done for

r
!
I
i

Table 3
Second Choice of Task as a Function of
Need, Probability and Failure

Treatment Categorl

i

C-C .2
Probability given .2
C-C .9
Probability given .9

High Need Condition
Task Choice
1 or 2
.2
(J)

Low Need Condition
Task Choice
1 or 2
:2

30%

(7)
70%

(4)
17%

(19)
83%

(10)
71%

(4)
29%

(8)
42%

(11)
58%

(J)

(J)

(J)

(28)
90%
(16)
76%

P-C .2
Probability Not Given .2

50%

50%

10%

P-C .9
Probability Not Given .9

(12)
57%

(9)
43%

(5)
24%

Note: Number in parentheses is N per

a~ll.

Results indicate that for the C-C groups, significantly more high
need subjects choose the task worth 5 points than low need subjects and
that low need subjects choose the tasks worth I or 2 points (X2
df.=l. p<.05).

= 4.25.

Also for the P-C groups significantly more high need

subjects choose the task worth 5 points and significantly more low need
. 2
subjects choose the tasks worth 1 or 2 points (X = 12.018, df.=l. p<.OOI).
Thus, it appears that need still determines choice but not to' the extent
that it had before failure was induced.
To determine if need is a greater determinant of choice than
probability on second choice, differences with respect to the number of
high need subjects choosing 5 or 1 and 2 on the second trial in the
17
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probability given (.9) treatment and the probability given (.2) treat-

ment were tested by means of four-celled chi-square tests.

Also. differences

with respect to the number of low need subjects choosing 5 or 1 and 2 in
the probability given (.9) treatment and the probability given (.2) treatment were tested by means of four-celled chi-square tests.

The same tests

were made for the probability not given (.9) and probability ,not given
(.2) treatments.

f2!

the

~

where the probability of success is given, the diff-

erence between the .9 and .2 condition with respect to the number of
high need subjects choosing 5 or 1 and 2 results in a chi-square of
2.536 (X2 = 2.536, df.=l, p<.2).

hlso, the difference between the .9

and .2 conditions with respect to the number of low need subjects choosirg
5 or 1 and 2 results in a chi-square of 2.021 (X2 = 2.021, df.=l, p<.2).
Thus, although there is not a significant difference between the high and
low probability conditions, there is a trend for probability to playa
more important

p~rt

in choice behavior after failure for those subjects

who initially were given probabilities of success.

!2! ~

£!!! where the probability ££ success is

n£i

given, there

is clearly no difference between the .9 and .2 conditions with respect to
the number of high need subjects choosing 5 or 1 and 2 (X2 = .0241, df.=l,
N.S.).nor with respect to the number of low need subjects choosing 5
or 1 and 2 on the second trial (X2 = .988, df.=l. N.S.).
Discussion

I

Perhaps the most general stat::ent that can be ma6e about this

I_H_._______________________________________________,__

II
~

'~~~UdY

is that in a low investment situation need will be the primary deter-

minant. of choice of a goal among a set of alternative goals but that knowleage of the probability of success in obtaining the goal will decrease
the weight of need in governing choice behavior.
According to decision making paradigms which state that choice of
a goal among a set of alternatives is a multiplicative function of the
valence of the goal and the probability of success in obtaining the goal
; it was predicted that in a low investment situation need would be a significant determinant of choice.
r10

Results indicate that high need subjects

in fact choose a goal which will meet their need (choosing a task worth

5 points over a task worth 1 or 2 points) and that low need subjects choose
a foal among a set of goals which will meet their need (choosing a task
worth 1 or 2 points over a task worth
the number of high and low need

5 points). The differences between

subje~ts

picking a task worth 5 points

or 1 and 2 pOlnts was significant at the .001 level. thus supporting the
hypothesis.

A finding worthy to point out here is that in a situation

in which there may be a "consumer surplus", the subject does not seek the
surplus but bases his choice primarily on need.

This is evidenced by

the fact that low need subjects choose tasks worth 1 or 2 points significantly more times than they did a task worth

5 points in the experimental

treatment category where the subject did not know the probabilities of
success prior to making his choice (X2 = 40.691, df.=l. p<.OOl).
Concerning whether neea is a greater determinant of choice than
probability of success in a low investment situation, results indicate
Uat in the treatment categories where the probability of success was given
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r:::or to the subject making a choice there was no significant difference

t
t

between the .9 probability of success condition and the .2 probability of
success condition with respect to the number of high need subjects choosing
a task worth 5 points and the number of low need subjects choosing a task
worth 1 or 2 points, thus supporting the hypothesis that in a low investment

, situation need will be greater determinant of choice than probability of
success.
Since most theories of individual decision making emphasize a multiplicative function of valence of goal (based on subject's need in the
case of tC1is experiment) and probability of success in attaining the goal,
it follows that if the valence of all goals among a set of alternative
goals are equal, choice of one goal among the set of alternatives will be
based on the probability of success of attaining each of the alternatives.
Also, if the probabilities of success for each goal are kept constant,
choice of one goal among a set of alternatives should be based on the
valence of each respective goal.

Such was the case as stated above when

high need subjects choose 5 and low need subjects choose 1 or 2 in the
probability not given treatments.
Following from this finding, however, it was predicted that there
should be a difference between the probability of success given treatment
and probability of success not given treatment, i.e., the subjects in the
probability not given treatment should base their decision on need and the
subjects in the probability given treatment should base their decision
on both valence of the goals and the probability of success of each goal
such that more high need subjects should choose 5 in the probability of
success not given treatment than in the probability of success given
20
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1 treatment and more low need su~jects should choose 1 or 2 in the probI
ability of success not given treatment than in the probability of success
given treatment.

Marginal sUh,ort in the fredicted direction was given to

these two hypotrieses in that the differences between the two treatment
categories with respect to high need subjects choosing 5 resulted in a chisquare of 2.78 (X2

= 2.78,

df.=l, p<.lO), and the difference between the

two treatment categories with respect to low need subjects resulted in a
chi-square of ).414 eX

2

= ).414, df.=l, p<:.lO).

The fact that only marginal significance was obtained may be explained
by the fact that the subjects were in a low investment situation.

The

subjects are required to obtain 5 experimental points by participating
in psychology experiments through the course of a semester.

Usually, a

subject will get only 1 experimental point for 1 hour of participation.
however, it had been made known to all subjects that the length of this
particluar experiment was only 15 minutes and that it was possible to
obtain all the necessary experimental points for a semester in the course
of 15 minutes.
Knowing this it is feasible to assume that the subjects in the
probability given treatment would be willing to gamble 15 minutes time in
order to obtain his required number of experimental points and thereby
disregard somewhat the probability of success attached to each task.
The effect of experimentally induced failure upon the determinants
~f

choice is not totally clear.

Need is still a powerful determinant of

choice as evidenced by the fact that in the probability given treatment,
high need subjects choose the task worth

21

5 points significantly more times

r·:han the low need subjects (X 2 = 4.25, df.=l, p<.05).

This same finding

1 holds true for the probability not given treatment (X2 = 12.018. df.=l,
P<' .001).

It is to be noted. however. that the obtained chi-square values

, for both major treatment categories are much smaller than the same c.hisquare obtained prior to failure (X

2

2

= 10.615. p~.OOl and X = 40.691.

df.=l, p<'.OOl respectively).
Does this mean that need is not as great a determinant of choice
after failure and that more recognition and weight is given to the probabilities involved?

The hypotheses predict both in the case of dissonance

theory and expectancy theory that probability will playa greater part as
a determinant of choice after failure than it had prior to failure. however,
the specific predictions generated from dissonance and expectancy theories
ciffer.
According to dissonance theory. i t was predicted that fewer high
need subjects should choose

5 after failure in the .9 treatments due to

the dissonance resulting between the two incompatible cognitions of "I
need the 5 points." and "I failed to obtain the 5 pOints even though I
had a high probability of obtaining them."

however. with regard to the

.2 treatment conditions. dissonance should not result because the two
cognitions of "I failed to get the needed points" and "the probability of
getting the needed points was low" are consonant.

As a result just as

many subjects should pick the same alternative in the .2 condition.
Therefore. dissonance theory predicts more recognition will be
given to the probability of success after failure but due to the prediction
of a decrease of subjects choosing 5 in the .9 condition after failure
22
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and no .difference in the number of subjects choosing 5 in the .2 condition,
the effect of probability will be obscured in determining whether prob-

I ability was

given more weight in the decision after failure.

!

mere inspection of the number of high need subjects choosing

However,

5 in the .9

and .2 conditions before and after failure indicates that this prediction
is not supported.
Decision theory predicted that upon failure those subjects with
high need picking 5 in the .2 conditions would try and "salvage" what they
can from the experiment when given a second chance and therefore would
place more weight on the probabilities such that there would be a difference

.9 and

between the

.2 conditions with respect to the number of high need

subjects picking 5 after failure and the number of low need subjects picking
1 or 2.

AlthouBh this hypothesis was not supported with respect to either

of the major treatment categories, there was a trend in the probability
given treatment category for more weight or emphasis being put on probability
in determining choice.
subjects picking
in X2

= 2.536,

The difference between the number of high need

5 in the .9 and .2 probability given treatment resulted

df.=l, p<.2 and for low need subjects was X2 = 2.021,

df.=l, p<:.2.
This trend was not found in the probability not given treatment
category.

The fact that the trend was found in the probability given

treatment but not in the probability not given treatment cannot be explained
at this point and is one of the limitations of this study.
The fact that the trend was found in the probability given condition
but was not significant can again be explained by the fact that the subject

23

was in a low investment situation and had so to speak "nothing to loose"
by disregarding probability of success.
Finally, it should be noted that the findings of this study are
in essential agreement with those found in other studies.
The finding that need is a determinant of choice of a goal among
a set of alternatives as well as knowledge concerning probability of
success in attaining alternative goals is in accord with the theoretical
work of Tolman (1959), Rotter (1955), Edwards (1954) and Vroom (1964)
and imparts a certain amount of empirical support to their contention
that there are two determinants of choice in a situation involving alternative sets of goals--namely, the valence of each goal as well as the
probability of attaining it.

The findings also provide a basis for

determining which factor, valence of goal or probability of attaining it,
should be given most emphasis in a low investment situation.

Finally.

the findings concerning the effects of failure on the determinants of
choice suggest that more emphasis is given to the probability of success
factor after failure to attain a goal, but due to the inconclusive evidence
at this point, this finding is highly tenative.
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Appendix I
Background of Experiment Explained to the Subject
and
Instructions Read to the Subject
Did you take the questionnaire administered on the first day of
Class?

(Every semester on the first day of class all Introductory Psych-

ology students take the Walker-Nicolay Personal Reaction Schedule).

The

students were then told, the reason I ask is that this experiment is concerned with two of the four scales built into the questionnaire and each
scale respectively measures if the student is high, medium or low anxious
and high, medium or low motivated.
The interest in these two particular scales is as follows:

the

graduate department in 'psychology here at Loyola as well as at Northwestern
and the University of Chicago often times have their graduate students
serve internships or clerkships at the Research Veteran's Hospital on the
south side of the city or at Kines V.A. in Maywood.
Often times the men on the staff of these institutions ask us in
turn to run a study for them in our respective universities.

The purpose

of our running the studies is to establish a base rate of performance for
a task on a "normal" population so that these men may in turn use this
b~se

rate of performance to compare with it the performance level of the

men within their respective institutions.
Currently there are a

l~rge

number of young men (19-22 years old)

being placed within one of these two hospitals.
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r--------;hese men are there as a result of their war experiences in Viet

I

Nam and they have been disabled in some manner or formi for example loss
of limb.

As a result of their W3.r experiences or as a result of their

injuries these men are either very high anxious or very low motivated.
What the hospital staff wants to know is if there is any relationship or correlation between anxiety and motivation and ability to perform
on tasks involving spatial orientation or manipulative ability or manuel
dexterity_
The hospital staff has not made any predictions or hypotheses but
are currently interested in establishing a base rate of performance.

They

have therefore, given me a standardized set of instructions to read to you.
I cannot deviate from these instructions and I cannot answer any questions
so you will have to listen very closely.
Since the instructions for this experiment are standardized, there
will be no questions.

The purpose of this experiment is to determine if

there are any correlations between two scales on the PRS questionnaire
and the wais Object Assembly test which is designed basically as a manipulatory test.
You see before you three Wais Object Assembly tasks each of which
has a number beside it.

This number represents the number of points you

will receive for this experiment if you pick that particular task.

For

example, if you choose task 1 you will receive one point for the experiment
and if you choose task 2 you will get two points for the experiment and
if you choose task

5 you will get 5 points for the experiment.

Usually Loyola only gives one point for one hour of participation
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I

in an experiment or for a fraction of an hour.

Sometimes a student will

get two points but this will depend on the length of the experiment-usually it is two hours long.
The length of this experiment is only about twenty minutes, however,
we have permission to give up to five points for the experiment, but this
will depend upon the individual subject.
Choice-Condition.--Before you make your choice as to which puzzle
you want to work with I must first tell

~ou

that task 1 and 2 have an

absolute certainty of being solved, however, tbe probability of obtaining
the solution to task 5 is .9 (.2 in the low expectancy condition), that
is, 9 out of 10 people usually solve task 5 (or only 2 out of 10 usually
solve task 5).
One other thing I must tell you before you make your choice is
that !!2. matter wtlich

.!:!!!.

you choose, should you fail to solve your task

within a two minute time limit you will not receive any points for the
experiment.

The reason for this is two-fold: (1) we have set up our design

in such a way that in order for us to make our correlations we need a
completed task within two minutes or less--anything over two minutes we
will not be able to use and you would be wasting your time as well as ours.
(2)

Secondly, we are interested in motivation and we hope that this in

turn will motivate you to complete your task within a given two minute
time limit.
Now out of the three tasks which would you prefer most to work
with? Least?
At the end of the two minute task period the subject was told,
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(first name of subject), you did not complete your task.

We cannot

use the information because we need a completed task from beginning to end.
If I were to ask you to leave now, you will not get any points and we
won't be able to use your data.

As an absolute, I will give you one more

two minute time limit to give us a completed task.

If you fail to solve

a task then, I will have to ask you to leave for sure.

Within the next

two minutes you may continue to work on your same task or you may pick
one of the other two.

If you choose to keep working on your same task,

I will have to take apart anything you may have done because we need a
completed task from start to end.

Now again, which task would you prefer

most to work with and which least?
Preference Condition.--The introduction and background given to
the subjects in this condition were the same as above with the exception
of the time in the instructions in which the probabilities of solving
each task were given to the subject.

Following the introduction to the

experiment, the subjects in this condition were told, one other thing
I must tell you before you make your choice is that n£ matter which

~

you choose, should you fail to solve your task within a two minute time
limit you will not receive any points for the experiment.

The reason for

this is two-fold: (1) we have set up our design in such a way that in
order for us to make our correlations we need a completed task within
two minutes or less--anything over two minutes we will not be able to use
and you would be wasting your time as well as ours.

(2)

Secondly, we are

interested in motivation and we hope that this in turn will motivate you
J

to complete your tasks with a given given two minute time limit.

,
--~-,'
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Now out of the three tasks which would you prefer most to work

I

f with?

Least?

I

After the subject made his decision as to which task he wanted to

I

work with he was then told, 1 can now tell you that task 5 has •• 9
(.2 in the low expectancy condition) probability of being solved, that is

9 out of 10 people (2 out of 10 people in the low expectancy condition)
usually solve this task within the given two minute time limit.

Task 1

and 2 respectively have an absolute certainty of being solved.
The instructions following the failure to solve the task within
the two minute time limit were the same as in the Choice condition.
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